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  Disturbance	  of	  self	  has	  long	  been	  recognized	  as	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  Borderline	  Personality	  Disorder.	  While	  it	  has	  received	  much	  attention	  from	  theorists,	  relatively	  little	  empirical	  study	  has	  examined	  the	  issue.	  One	  reason	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  conceptualizing	  and	  operationalizing	  the	  associated	  phenomena.	  This	  thesis	  reviews	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  literature	  on	  the	  self	  and	  its	  disturbance	  in	  BPD.	  It	  takes	  an	  integrative	  approach,	  drawing	  from	  cognitive,	  behavioral,	  psychodynamic,	  and	  neurobiological	  viewpoints.	  Within	  this	  context	  it	  presents	  a	  model	  of	  self	  disturbance	  in	  BPD,	  organizing	  processes	  by	  time	  scale	  as	  well	  as	  types	  of	  phenomenological	  self.	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Table	  1:	  DSM-­‐5	  Criteria	  for	  Borderline	  Personality	  Disorder	  
Language	  pertaining	  to	  self	  disturbance	  is	  indicated	  in	  boldface	  type.	  1.	  Frantic	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  real	  or	  imagined	  abandonment.	  (Note:	  Do	  not	  include	  suicidal	  or	  self-­‐mutilating	  behavior	  covered	  in	  Criterion	  5.)	  2.	  A	  pattern	  of	  unstable	  and	  intense	  interpersonal	  relationships	  characterized	  by	  alternating	  between	  extremes	  of	  idealization	  and	  devaluation.	  
3.	  Identity	  disturbance:	  markedly	  and	  persistently	  unstable	  self-­image	  or	  sense	  of	  self.	  4.	  Impulsivity	  in	  at	  least	  two	  areas	  that	  are	  potentially	  self-­‐damaging	  (e.g.,	  spending,	  sex,	  substance	  abuse,	  reckless	  driving,	  binge	  eating).	  (Note:	  Do	  not	  include	  suicidal	  or	  self-­‐mutilating	  behavior	  covered	  in	  Criterion	  5.)	  5.	  Recurrent	  suicidal	  behavior,	  gestures,	  or	  threats,	  or	  self-­‐mutilating	  behavior.	  6.	  Affective	  instability	  due	  to	  a	  marked	  reactivity	  of	  mood	  (e.g.,	  intense	  episodic	  dysphoria,	  irritability,	  or	  anxiety	  usually	  lasting	  a	  few	  hours	  and	  only	  rarely	  more	  than	  a	  few	  days).	  
7.	  Chronic	  feelings	  of	  emptiness.	  8.	  Inappropriate,	  intense	  anger	  or	  difficulty	  controlling	  anger	  (e.g.,	  frequent	  displays	  of	  temper,	  constant	  anger,	  recurrent	  physical	  fights).	  
9.	  Transient,	  stress-­related	  paranoid	  ideation	  or	  severe	  dissociative	  symptoms.	  
	  
There	  may	  be	  an	  identity	  disturbance	  characterized	  by	  markedly	  and	  persistently	  
unstable	  self-­image	  or	  sense	  of	  self.	  There	  are	  sudden	  and	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  self-­image,	  
characterized	  by	  shifting	  goals,	  values,	  and	  vocational	  aspirations.	  There	  may	  be	  sudden	  
changes	  in	  opinions	  and	  plans	  about	  career,	  sexual	  identity,	  values,	  and	  types	  of	  friends.	  
These	  individuals	  may	  suddenly	  change	  from	  the	  role	  of	  a	  needy	  supplicant	  for	  help	  to	  that	  
of	  a	  righteous	  avenger	  of	  past	  mistreatment.	  Although	  they	  usually	  have	  a	  self-­image	  that	  
is	  based	  on	  being	  bad	  or	  evil,	  individuals	  with	  this	  disorder	  may	  at	  times	  have	  feelings	  that	  
they	  do	  not	  exist	  at	  all.	  Such	  experiences	  usually	  occur	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  
feels	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  meaningful	  relationship,	  nurturing,	  and	  support.	  These	  individuals	  may	  
show	  worse	  performance	  in	  unstructured	  work	  or	  school	  situations.	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The	  DSM-­‐5	  (2013),	  and	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  ICD-­‐10	  (1992)	  both	  include	  a	  disturbance	  in	  self.	  This	  has	  been	  a	  recognized	  component	  of	  the	  borderline	  construct	  since	  Otto	  Kernberg	  included	  weak	  identity	  formation	  in	  his	  definition	  of	  borderline	  personality	  organization	  (1967).	  It	  is	  recognized	  in	  models	  of	  BPD	  from	  all	  theoretical	  perspectives.	  For	  example,	  Marsha	  Linehan’s	  reorganization	  of	  the	  BPD	  diagnostic	  criteria	  includes	  “self	  dysfunction”	  as	  one	  of	  five	  categories	  (1993).	  	  The	  current	  thesis	  reviews	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  self	  in	  BPD	  and	  discusses	  possibilities	  for	  future	  investigation.	  Following	  recent	  efforts	  to	  identify	  areas	  of	  convergence	  in	  theoretical	  viewpoints	  (Chard	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Louw	  &	  Straker,	  2002),	  this	  thesis	  will	  take	  an	  integrative	  approach.	  A	  model	  of	  self	  disturbance	  in	  BPD,	  which	  synthesizes	  aspects	  of	  psychodynamic,	  behavioral,	  and	  cognitive	  theory,	  is	  proposed.	  
Clinical	  Presentation	  	   A	  disturbance	  in	  self	  is	  manifested	  in	  multiple	  ways	  in	  BPD.	  One	  is	  entirely	  subjective	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  chronic	  feeling	  of	  emptiness	  (DSM	  Criterion	  3).	  Gunderson	  and	  Links	  (2008)	  call	  this	  a	  “terrifying	  loss	  of	  self”	  and	  Wilkinson-­‐Ryan	  and	  Westen	  (2000)	  call	  it	  “painful	  incoherence.”	  Gunderson	  and	  Links	  emphasize	  the	  physical	  nature	  of	  emptiness	  in	  BPD,	  describing	  it	  as	  “a	  visceral	  feeling,	  usually	  in	  the	  abdomen	  or	  chest,	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  fears	  of	  not	  existing	  or	  with	  existential	  anguish.”	  This	  experience	  is	  typically	  regarded	  as	  being	  intertwined	  with	  the	  individual’s	  interpersonal	  context.	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DSM	  Criterion	  7	  is	  a	  relatively	  broad	  category	  of	  disturbance	  of	  identity,	  also	  termed	  self-­‐image.	  This	  reflects	  a	  marked	  tendency	  of	  individuals	  with	  BPD	  to	  adopt	  the	  habits,	  values,	  and	  attitudes	  of	  those	  around	  them,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  who	  they	  are.	  There	  is	  a	  concomitant	  instability	  of	  interests,	  occupations,	  and	  commitments	  over	  time.	  This	  criterion	  also	  includes	  the	  body	  image	  distortions	  often	  seen	  in	  anorexia	  nervosa	  and	  body	  dysmorphic	  disorder	  and	  intensely	  negative	  judgments	  of	  oneself	  as	  being	  “bad”	  or	  “evil.”	  	   Finally,	  DSM	  Criterion	  9	  indicates	  transient,	  stress-­‐induced	  psychotic	  symptoms,	  including	  dissociation.	  These	  may	  include	  depersonalization,	  derealization	  and/or	  paranoid	  ideation	  or	  other	  cognitive	  distortions.	  These	  symptoms	  represent	  disturbances	  of	  self	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  alter	  self-­‐perception.	  The	  DSM-­‐5	  includes	  an	  alternative	  diagnostic	  model	  of	  personality	  disorders	  in	  its	  appendix.	  The	  alternative	  model	  is	  dimensional,	  intended	  to	  reflect	  the	  current	  empirical	  models	  of	  personality	  pathology.	  Criterion	  A	  in	  this	  model	  includes	  four	  elements	  of	  personality	  functioning.	  Identity	  and	  Self-­‐direction	  describe	  self	  functioning,	  while	  Empathy	  and	  Intimacy	  describe	  interpersonal	  functioning.	  The	  BPD	  criteria	  in	  the	  alternative	  model	  includes	  disturbed	  self-­‐image,	  emptiness,	  and	  dissociation	  under	  the	  Identity	  element	  and	  instability	  in	  goals,	  aspirations,	  values,	  or	  career	  plans	  under	  the	  Self-­‐direction	  element.	  See	  Schmeck	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  for	  case	  examples	  of	  diagnosis	  of	  identity-­‐related	  dimensions	  using	  the	  DSM-­‐5	  alternative	  model.	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Psychological	  Theories	  of	  Self	  Self	  has	  been	  addressed	  in	  many	  traditions	  and	  beginning	  long	  before	  modern	  psychology.	  The	  concept	  of	  self	  has	  been	  a	  central	  concern	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  psychology.	  There	  have	  been	  myriad	  theories	  that	  attempt	  to	  account	  for	  the	  self,	  as	  well	  as	  definitions	  of	  the	  self	  and	  related	  constructs.	  In	  order	  to	  cogently	  address	  the	  role	  of	  self	  in	  BPD,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  a	  working	  model	  of	  self	  in	  general.	  	  
James	  	   William	  James’s	  (1890)	  theoretical	  writings	  of	  self	  are	  among	  the	  first	  in	  psychology.	  Among	  his	  major	  contributions	  are	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  empirical,	  objective,	  self	  (represented	  by	  “me”),	  and	  the	  subjective	  self,	  pure	  Ego	  (represented	  by	  “I”).	  The	  empirical	  self	  consists	  of	  the	  material	  self,	  the	  social	  self,	  and	  the	  spiritual	  self.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  study	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  as	  interpersonal	  as	  BPD	  is	  James’s	  social	  self.	  Of	  this	  he	  writes,	  “A	  man	  has	  as	  many	  social	  selves	  as	  there	  are	  individuals	  who	  recognize	  him	  and	  carry	  an	  image	  of	  him	  in	  their	  mind.”	  The	  following	  passage	  is	  particularly	  salient	  when	  considered	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  intense,	  unstable	  relationships	  that	  characterize	  BPD:	  “The	  most	  peculiar	  social	  self	  which	  one	  is	  apt	  to	  have	  is	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  person	  one	  is	  in	  love	  with.	  The	  good	  or	  bad	  fortunes	  of	  this	  self	  cause	  the	  most	  intense	  elation	  and	  dejection	  -­‐	  unreasonable	  enough	  as	  measured	  by	  every	  other	  standard	  than	  that	  of	  the	  organic	  feeling	  of	  the	  individual.	  To	  his	  own	  consciousness	  he	  is	  not,	  so	  long	  as	  this	  particular	  social	  self	  fails	  to	  get	  recognition,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  recognized	  his	  contentment	  passes	  all	  bounds.”	  	  
Freud	  
	   Sigmund	  Freud	  (1947),	  the	  founder	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  conceived	  of	  a	  self	  consisting	  of	  interacting,	  functional	  parts.	  His	  tripartite	  model	  included	  the	  Ego,	  the	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Id,	  and	  the	  Superego.	  The	  Id	  encompasses	  unconscious	  instinctual	  drives	  such	  as	  sex	  and	  aggression.	  The	  Ego	  inhibits	  the	  Id	  based	  on	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  The	  Superego	  internalizes	  societal	  values	  and	  morals	  and	  serves	  to	  influence	  the	  Ego	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  them.	  Both	  the	  Ego	  and	  Superego	  extend	  from	  conscious	  to	  preconscious	  and	  unconscious.	  
Erikson	  
	   Erik	  Erikson	  (1959)	  was	  a	  psychodynamic	  psychologist	  who	  formulated	  a	  stage	  model	  of	  human	  development,	  of	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  was	  a	  key	  component.	  According	  to	  his	  model,	  identity	  (also	  called	  ego	  identity)	  is	  an	  individual’s	  representation	  or	  knowledge	  of	  oneself.	  Identity	  is	  subject	  to	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  development	  featuring	  psychosocial	  crises	  that	  must	  resolved	  to	  progress	  successfully	  to	  the	  next	  stage.	  Identity	  becomes	  more	  stable	  in	  adolescence	  through	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  Identity	  versus	  Role	  Confusion	  (or	  Diffusion).	  If	  this	  is	  not	  achieved,	  then	  identity	  will	  be	  unstable	  moving	  into	  young	  adulthood.	  
Kohut	  
	   Heinz	  Kohut	  (1971)	  pioneered	  a	  branch	  of	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  known	  as	  Self	  Psychology,	  which	  is	  an	  offshoot	  of	  Object	  Relations	  Theory.	  Departing	  from	  Freudian	  drive	  theory,	  Kohut	  emphasized	  the	  empathic	  needs	  of	  the	  self.	  He	  theorized	  that	  responses	  of	  a	  child’s	  caretaker	  (the	  “selfobject”)	  to	  a	  child’s	  psychological	  needs	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  self.	  He	  formulated	  a	  bipolar	  self	  with	  ambitions	  on	  one	  pole,	  ideals	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  innate	  skills	  and	  talents	  in	  the	  intermediate	  area	  between	  the	  poles.	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  theorists,	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Kohut	  saw	  narcissism	  as	  a	  healthy	  aspect	  of	  early	  development	  in	  which	  the	  selfobject	  (caregiver)	  is	  experienced	  as	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  self.	  	  
Skinner	  
	   B.	  F.	  Skinner’s	  (1953)	  radical	  behavioral	  account	  of	  self	  eschews	  reification	  of	  and	  assignation	  of	  causal	  agency	  to	  internal	  constructs.	  Instead,	  Skinner	  defines	  the	  self	  as	  “a	  functionally	  unified	  system	  of	  responses.”	  Self-­‐knowledge	  is	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  repertoire	  applying	  the	  behavior	  of	  knowing	  to	  one’s	  own	  overt	  or	  covert	  behaviors.	  This	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  counterpart	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  self-­‐concept	  or	  self-­‐representation,	  reinterpreted	  as	  a	  behavioral	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  mental	  entity.	  	  
Hayes	  	   Current	  radical	  behavioral	  (also	  known	  as	  functional	  contextual)	  approaches	  build	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  Skinnerian	  theory.	  Steven	  Hayes	  has	  developed	  a	  psychotherapy,	  Acceptance	  and	  Commitment	  Therapy	  (Hayes,	  Strosahl,	  &	  Wilson	  1999),	  and	  a	  behavioral	  theory	  of	  language	  and	  cognition,	  Relational	  Frame	  Theory	  (Hayes,	  Barnes-­‐Holmes,	  &	  Roche,	  2001),	  that	  is	  ostensibly	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  therapy.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  there	  are	  three	  types	  of	  self:	  the	  conceptualized	  self	  (also	  called	  self-­‐as-­‐content),	  the	  knowing	  self,	  and	  the	  transcendent	  self	  (also	  called	  self-­‐as-­‐context).	  These	  arise	  from	  perspective-­‐taking	  via	  verbal	  behavior	  (McHugh	  &	  Stewart,	  2012).	  	  
Beck	  
	   Aaron	  Beck,	  the	  developer	  of	  cognitive	  therapy,	  proposed	  an	  elaboration	  on	  the	  basic	  cognitive	  construct	  of	  the	  schema	  –	  the	  mode	  -­‐	  that	  has	  implications	  for	  a	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model	  of	  self	  (1996).	  He	  described	  modes	  as	  “network[s]	  of	  cognitive,	  affective,	  motivational,	  and	  behavioral	  components	  …	  consisting	  of	  integrated	  sectors	  or	  suborganizations	  of	  personality	  …	  designed	  to	  deal	  with	  specific	  demands	  or	  problems.”	  	  
Dennett	  




	   Shaun	  Gallagher	  (2000)	  links	  philosophical	  notions	  of	  self	  with	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  He	  proposes	  two	  selves:	  the	  minimal	  self	  and	  the	  narrative	  self.	  The	  minimal	  self	  is	  the	  basic	  subjective	  experience	  of	  self	  in	  the	  present	  moment,	  analogous	  to	  James’s	  pure	  ego.	  The	  narrative	  self	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  objective	  self,	  an	  ongoing	  narrative	  construction.	  Gallagher	  further	  points	  to	  two	  components	  of	  the	  minimal	  self:	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership.	  A	  sense	  of	  agency	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  an	  action	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  self.	  A	  sense	  of	  ownership	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  it	  is	  the	  self	  who	  is	  acting.	  
Summary	  
	   The	  model	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  represents	  an	  integrative	  approach	  built	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  would	  be	  valuable	  to	  draw	  on	  literature	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  theoretical	  perspectives.	  Therefore,	  finding	  commonalities	  among	  approaches	  is	  an	  important	  task.	  One	  can	  find	  several	  concepts	  among	  the	  disparate	  theories	  of	  self	  that	  are	  largely	  similar	  to	  one	  another	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  parsing	  the	  complex	  phenomena	  comprising	  BPD.	  The	  oldest	  theory	  discussed	  here	  is	  James’s,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  more	  generally	  useful.	  Following	  the	  categories	  set	  forth	  by	  James	  as	  well	  as	  Hayes	  and	  other	  developers	  of	  Relational	  Frame	  Theory,	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  the	  Objective,	  Subjective,	  and	  Transcendental	  Selves	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  Phenomenological	  Self.	  	  	   Objective	  Self.	  James	  calls	  this	  the	  empirical	  self.	  In	  broad	  terms,	  the	  objective	  self	  is	  analogous	  to	  Erikson’s	  ego	  identity,	  Skinner’s	  behavior	  of	  knowing	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self,	  Hayes’s	  conceptualized	  self,	  and	  the	  narrative	  self	  expounded	  by	  Gallagher.	  With	  respect	  to	  narrative	  point-­‐of-­‐view,	  it	  constitutes	  the	  third-­‐person	  self.	  	  	   Subjective	  Self.	  This	  is	  the	  first-­‐person	  self.	  It	  is	  analogous	  to	  James’s	  pure	  ego	  and	  Hayes’s	  knowing	  self.	  This	  is	  “who”	  experiences	  sensations,	  feelings,	  and	  thoughts	  in	  the	  present	  moment.	  It	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  Gallagher’s	  minimal	  self.	  
	   Transcendental	  Self.	  Hayes	  proposes	  a	  transcendental	  self	  (also	  called	  self-­‐as-­‐context)	  that	  is	  essentially	  the	  present	  moment	  experience	  of	  self	  (Gallagher’s	  minimal	  self)	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  observer.	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  Freud’s	  concept	  of	  the	  observing	  ego.	  	   Multiplicity.	  One	  common	  element	  among	  many	  of	  these	  approaches	  is	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  self.	  The	  self	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  system	  of	  parts,	  or	  at	  least	  organized	  around	  multiple	  divisions	  of	  the	  behavioral	  stream.	  Despite	  their	  divergent	  theoretical	  assumptions,	  Beck’s	  modes,	  Dennett’s	  account	  of	  a	  center	  of	  narrative	  gravity,	  and	  Skinner’s	  account	  of	  a	  functionally	  unified	  system	  of	  responses	  bear	  strong	  resemblances	  to	  one	  another.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  theorists	  discussed	  here,	  many	  others	  have	  proposed	  similar	  concepts,	  including	  Carl	  Jung	  (1968),	  Roberto	  Assagioli	  (2000),	  John	  Rowan	  (2005),	  Fritz	  Perls	  (1951),	  Elizabeth	  Howell	  (2005),	  and	  Richard	  Schwartz	  (1995).	  The	  model	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  will	  use	  the	  term	  
functional	  selves	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  divisions	  of	  self.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  functional	  selves	  approach	  true	  vertical	  partitions	  of	  personality	  (Rowan	  uses	  the	  term	  “subpersonalities”).	  In	  Schwartz’s	  Internal	  Family	  Systems	  therapy,	  for	  example,	  clients	  and	  therapists	  interact	  with	  these	  “parts	  of	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self”	  as	  if	  speaking	  with	  another	  person.	  Perls’s	  famous	  Gestalt	  Therapy	  empty	  chair	  exercise	  takes	  a	  similar	  approach.	  Many	  trauma	  and	  dissociation	  researchers	  such	  as	  Howell	  see	  the	  dramatic	  dissociation	  of	  selves	  such	  as	  that	  seen	  in	  Dissociative	  Identity	  Disorder	  as	  an	  extreme	  splitting	  of	  normal	  multiplicity	  due	  to	  trauma.	  Others	  see	  multiplicity	  as	  purely	  pathological,	  not	  on	  a	  normal	  spectrum	  –	  in	  fact,	  some	  think	  Dissociative	  Identity	  Disorder	  is	  iatrogenic	  in	  origin	  and	  not	  an	  indication	  of	  any	  underlying	  structure	  (Paris,	  2012).	  The	  model	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  position	  that	  multiple	  functional	  selves	  are,	  to	  some	  degree,	  independent,	  are	  a	  normative	  phenomenon,	  and	  include	  cognitive,	  affective,	  motivational,	  and	  behavioral	  levels.	  Apart	  from	  that,	  the	  model	  is	  agnostic.	  
Theories	  of	  Disturbance	  of	  Self	  in	  BPD	  
Psychodynamic	  Theories	  
	   Beginning	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  quantity	  of	  psychodynamic	  literature	  on	  BPD,	  or,	  to	  use	  Otto	  Kernberg’s	  term,	  Borderline	  Personality	  Organization,	  greatly	  expanded.	  Most	  of	  the	  modern	  psychodynamic	  theorizing	  draws	  on	  object	  relations	  and/or	  attachment	  theory.	  They	  share	  an	  emphasis	  on	  mental	  representations	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  	  	   Kernberg.	  The	  theories	  of	  Otto	  Kernberg	  (1967;	  1975;	  1989)	  have	  been	  among	  the	  most	  influential	  in	  the	  clinical	  literature	  on	  BPD.	  Kernberg	  applies	  object	  relations	  theory	  to	  psychodynamic	  treatment	  of	  BPD	  clients.	  They	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  of	  the	  modern	  treatments	  developed	  for	  BPD,	  Transference	  Focused	  Psychotherapy	  (Clarkin,	  Yeomans,	  &	  Kernberg,	  2006).	  His	  theory	  posits	  that	  various	  representations	  of	  self	  and	  other	  are	  internalized	  during	  development,	  with	  each	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self-­‐other	  pair	  joined	  by	  a	  particular	  affect.	  Kernberg	  states	  that	  disturbances	  in	  the	  self	  as	  well	  as	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  integrate	  positive	  and	  negative	  representations	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  He	  theorizes	  this	  as	  a	  psychological	  defense	  called	  “splitting”	  –	  the	  active	  separation	  of	  the	  good	  image	  of	  self	  or	  other	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  contamination	  by	  the	  bad	  image.	  Kernberg	  places	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  aggression	  in	  the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  BPD.	  He	  says	  that	  an	  excess	  of	  hostile	  affect	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  BPD.	  	   Masterson.	  James	  Masterson	  (1976)	  emphasizes	  failures	  of	  individuation	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  BPD.	  He	  postulates	  that	  mothers	  of	  children	  with	  BPD	  often	  have	  BPD	  themselves.	  Building	  on	  Margaret	  Mahler’s	  account	  of	  self	  development	  in	  children	  and	  D.	  W.	  Winnicott’s	  ideas	  of	  the	  “true	  self”	  and	  “false	  self,”	  Masterson	  sees	  the	  primary	  treatment	  goal	  in	  psychotherapy	  with	  BPD	  clients	  as	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  real	  self.	  According	  to	  his	  theory,	  a	  child	  develops	  a	  false	  or	  defensive	  self	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  please	  his/her	  attachment	  figure.	  This	  false	  self	  can	  become	  predominant	  when	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  real	  self	  is	  disrupted	  during	  development.	  	  	   Adler/Buie.	  Gerald	  Adler	  and	  Dan	  Buie	  (1982)	  also	  take	  a	  developmental	  approach.	  They	  explain	  intolerance	  of	  aloneness	  and	  difficulty	  with	  self-­‐soothing	  as	  the	  results	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  internalize	  a	  relationship	  with	  an	  empathic	  parental	  figure.	  This	  leaves	  an	  individual	  without	  a	  soothing	  “introject”	  to	  utilize	  when	  in	  emotional	  distress.	  Adler	  and	  Buie	  see	  a	  primary	  task	  of	  psychotherapy	  with	  borderline	  clients	  as	  the	  development	  of	  such	  introjects	  via	  the	  therapeutic	  relationship.	  	   Fonagy	  and	  Bateman.	  Peter	  Fonagy	  and	  Anthony	  Bateman	  (2006)	  developed	  a	  psychodynamic	  treatment	  for	  BPD	  called	  Mentalization	  Based	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Treatment	  that	  also	  arises	  from	  developmental	  theory.	  They	  draw	  heavily	  on	  the	  attachment	  theories	  of	  Bowlby	  and	  Ainsworth.	  Their	  essential	  premise	  is	  that	  BPD	  is	  characterized	  by	  failures	  in	  mentalizing,	  or	  conceiving	  of	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  self	  and	  others.	  Mentalization	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  construct	  of	  Theory	  of	  Mind	  in	  cognitive	  psychology,	  although	  Fonagy	  and	  Bateman	  emphasize	  that	  mentalization	  is	  mostly	  preconscious	  and	  dependent	  on	  affective	  responses.	  Mentalization	  is	  thought	  to	  develop	  via	  attachment	  relationships,	  and	  thus	  the	  mentalization	  failures	  underlying	  borderline	  pathology	  arise	  from	  disturbed	  attachments.	  Like	  Masterson,	  Fonagy	  and	  Bateman	  incorporate	  a	  false	  self	  in	  their	  theory,	  calling	  it	  the	  alien	  self.	  The	  alien	  self	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  internalized	  representation	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  attachment	  figure	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  an	  authentic	  sense	  of	  self.	  It	  disrupts	  the	  true	  self	  and	  leads	  to	  dysfunctional	  interpersonal	  behaviors	  in	  the	  service	  of	  establishing	  coherence.	  	  	   Gunderson.	  John	  Gunderson	  (Gunderson	  &	  Links,	  2008)	  was	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  BPD	  in	  the	  DSM,	  starting	  with	  the	  Third	  Edition	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1980).	  Informed	  by	  theorists	  such	  as	  Masterson,	  Adler,	  and	  Fonagy,	  Gunderson	  regards	  intolerance	  of	  aloneness	  as	  the	  core	  of	  BPD.	  
Cognitive-­Behavioral	  and	  Integrative	  Theories	  	   Linehan.	  Marsha	  Linehan’s	  biosocial	  model	  of	  BPD	  underlies	  her	  cognitive-­‐behavioral	  treatment,	  Dialectical	  Behavior	  Therapy	  (1992).	  Linehan	  posits	  that	  the	  core	  processes	  of	  BPD	  are	  emotional	  dysregulation	  and	  impulsive	  behavior.	  The	  etiology	  is	  linked	  to	  biological	  predisposition	  to	  those	  two	  processes,	  interacting	  with	  an	  invalidating	  environment.	  According	  to	  Linehan,	  self-­‐disturbance	  is	  partly	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attributable	  to	  overwhelming	  emotional	  intensity	  and	  instability	  (1992;	  Heard	  &	  Linehan,	  1993).	  Intense,	  unstable	  emotion	  leads	  to	  unstable	  behavior	  and	  cognition.	  Consequently,	  the	  experience	  of	  self	  as	  well	  as	  the	  feedback	  from	  others	  can	  be	  inconsistent	  and	  leads	  to	  an	  unstable	  self-­‐concept.	  Additionally,	  excessive	  dependence	  on	  others	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  inhibit	  emotional	  responses	  also	  disrupt	  a	  sense	  of	  self.	  She	  also	  offers	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  perspective,	  hypothesizing	  that	  people	  have	  relational	  selves	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  invalidated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  individualistic	  Western	  culture.	  
Kohlenberg	  and	  Tsai.	  Robert	  Kohlenberg	  and	  Mavis	  Tsai	  (1995),	  developers	  of	  Functional	  Analytic	  Psychotherapy,	  offer	  a	  functional	  contextual	  account	  of	  self-­‐disturbance	  in	  BPD,	  building	  on	  Skinner’s	  explanation	  of	  self.	  In	  their	  model,	  a	  weak	  sense	  of	  self	  results	  from	  an	  individual’s	  behavior	  being	  too	  publicly	  controlled.	  	  	   Young.	  Jeffery	  Young	  developed	  Schema	  Therapy	  (Young,	  Klosko,	  &	  Weishaar,	  2003),	  a	  cognitive	  therapy	  for	  BPD	  influenced	  by	  theorists	  such	  as	  Aaron	  Beck.	  Young’s	  theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  maladaptive	  cognitive	  schemata	  that	  develop	  in	  children	  in	  the	  service	  of	  meeting	  emotional	  needs.	  He	  also	  identifies	  schema	  modes	  that	  correspond	  to	  specific	  patterns	  of	  affect	  and	  behavior.	  	  
	   Ryle.	  Ryle	  (1995;	  1997)	  proposed	  a	  model	  of	  BPD	  supporting	  his	  therapeutic	  approach,	  Cognitive	  Analytic	  Therapy,	  which	  combines	  cognitive	  and	  psychodynamic	  theory.	  He	  called	  it	  the	  “multiple	  self	  states	  model”	  because	  he	  proposes	  partially	  dissociated	  self	  states	  to	  explain	  the	  shifts	  in	  behavior	  seen	  in	  BPD.	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Empirical	  Investigation	  of	  Self-­disturbance	  in	  BPD	  While	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  disturbance	  of	  self	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  BPD,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  abundance	  of	  theory	  to	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenon,	  it	  remains	  the	  feature	  of	  BPD	  with	  the	  least	  empirical	  investigation.	  This	  is	  no	  doubt	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  variegated	  and	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  theories	  of	  the	  self	  and	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  reliably	  discerning	  and	  measuring	  self-­‐related	  phenomena.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  operational	  definition	  with	  much	  degree	  of	  support.	  However,	  a	  few	  recent	  empirical	  studies	  have	  examined	  self	  disturbance	  in	  BPD	  from	  different	  perspectives.	  Wilkinson-­‐Ryan	  and	  Westen	  (2000)	  conducted	  a	  study	  of	  clinicians’	  reports	  of	  identity	  disturbance.	  They	  sampled	  each	  of	  95	  clinicians	  (psychologists,	  psychiatrists,	  and	  social	  workers)	  about	  a	  single	  patient.	  Clinician	  reports	  of	  patients	  with	  BPD	  (n=34),	  patients	  with	  other	  personality	  disorders	  (n=20),	  and	  patients	  with	  no	  personality	  disorder	  (n=41)	  were	  compared.	  	  Principal	  components	  analysis	  of	  the	  survey	  items	  yielded	  four	  factors:	  role	  absorption,	  painful	  incoherence,	  inconsistency,	  and	  lack	  of	  commitment.	  They	  also	  ran	  a	  multiple	  regression	  analysis	  to	  determine	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  four	  identity	  factors	  would	  predict	  a	  BPD	  diagnosis	  above	  and	  beyond	  gender	  and	  sexual	  abuse	  history.	  They	  found	  that	  gender	  and	  sexual	  abuse	  alone	  predicted	  25.0%	  of	  the	  variance.	  Adding	  the	  four	  identity	  factors	  accounted	  for	  an	  additional	  20.0%	  of	  the	  variance,	  a	  highly	  significant	  change	  (F=7.61,	  df=4,	  70,	  p<0.001).	  	  Koenigsberg	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  tested	  correlations	  between	  measures	  of	  the	  BPD-­‐related	  traits	  of	  impulsive	  aggression	  and	  affective	  instability	  with	  measures	  of	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identity	  and	  interpersonal	  disturbance	  as	  well	  as	  the	  utilization	  of	  psychodynamic	  defense	  mechanisms.	  They	  found	  that	  affective	  instability	  was	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  identity	  disturbance	  and	  feelings	  of	  emptiness.	  	  Jørgensen	  (2009)	  utilized	  Berzonsky’s	  social-­‐cognitive	  construct	  of	  identity	  style	  to	  study	  identity	  disturbance	  in	  BPD.	  Berzonsky	  outlined	  three	  identity	  styles:	  information	  seeking,	  normative,	  and	  diffuse-­‐avoidant,	  in	  order	  from	  most	  adaptive	  to	  least.	  Jørgensen	  administered	  Berzonsky’s	  Identity	  Styles	  Inventory	  to	  a	  BPD	  group	  and	  a	  control	  group.	  He	  found	  that	  the	  level	  of	  information	  seeking	  style	  was	  significantly	  lower	  and	  that	  of	  diffuse-­‐avoidant	  style	  was	  significantly	  higher	  in	  a	  BPD	  group	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  control	  group.	  	  Adler,	  Chin,	  Kolisetty,	  and	  Oltmanns	  (2012)	  examined	  identity	  disturbance	  using	  Dan	  McAdam’s	  framework	  of	  narrative	  identity.	  The	  methodology	  utilized	  was	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  responses	  to	  a	  structured	  “life	  story”	  interview.	  Coders	  identifed	  instances	  of	  a	  priori	  defined	  themes.	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  themes	  of	  agency,	  communion,	  communion	  fulfillment,	  and	  narrative	  coherence	  were	  coded.	  	  Similarly,	  Jørgensen	  (2012)	  studied	  characteristics	  of	  the	  autobiographical	  memories	  of	  a	  BPD	  group,	  an	  Obsessive-­‐Compulsive	  Disorder	  (OCD)	  group,	  and	  a	  control	  group.	  He	  used	  Rubin	  et	  al.’s	  Life	  Story	  Event	  Task	  (2009)	  to	  elicit	  autobiographical	  memories.	  Using	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  cultural	  life	  script,	  a	  standard	  account	  of	  major	  life	  events	  in	  a	  given	  culture,	  Jørgensen	  generated	  typicality	  scores	  for	  participants’	  narratives	  in	  comparison	  with	  a	  Danish	  life	  script.	  He	  also	  scored	  memories	  on	  specificity	  and	  categorized	  them	  using	  a	  “high-­‐point	  analysis”	  of	  their	  narrative	  structure.	  The	  BPD	  group	  reported	  more	  self-­‐rated	  negative	  events,	  less	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typical	  life	  events,	  and	  more	  memories	  that	  were	  coded	  as	  having	  a	  “leap-­‐frogging/disorganized”	  style.	  Jørgensen	  extended	  his	  earlier	  findings	  on	  identity	  style	  in	  BPD	  in	  this	  study,	  finding	  that	  the	  BPD	  group	  had	  a	  significantly	  higher	  diffuse	  identity	  style	  score	  compared	  to	  both	  the	  control	  group	  and	  the	  OCD	  group.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  studies	  provide	  some	  evidence	  of	  self/identity	  disturbance	  in	  BPD	  that	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  other	  disorders.	  It	  manifests	  in	  multiple	  ways,	  including	  a	  weak	  or	  unstable	  subjective	  sense	  of	  self,	  and	  in	  self-­‐relevant	  behaviors	  such	  as	  inconsistency	  and	  incoherence	  in	  the	  narration	  of	  autobiographical	  events.	  	  
Neurobiology:	  The	  Default	  Mode	  Network	  	   A	  promising	  avenue	  for	  identifying	  the	  neural	  correlates	  of	  self,	  and,	  by	  extension,	  disturbances	  in	  self	  like	  those	  seen	  in	  BPD,	  is	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Default	  Mode	  Network	  (DMN)	  of	  the	  brain.	  The	  identification	  of	  the	  DMN	  was	  entirely	  due	  to	  neuroimaging	  research.	  Most	  imaging	  studies	  scan	  a	  participant’s	  brain	  while	  he/she	  is	  performing	  a	  task.	  To	  establish	  a	  “baseline”	  for	  comparison,	  it	  is	  standard	  to	  also	  perform	  a	  scan	  while	  participants	  are	  in	  a	  “resting	  state,”	  meaning	  not	  engaged	  in	  the	  experimental	  task.	  The	  accumulation	  of	  data	  across	  imaging	  studies	  revealed	  that	  the	  resting	  state	  is	  reliably	  characterized	  by	  significant	  activity	  in	  a	  network	  of	  brain	  structures.	  These	  include	  the	  ventral	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vMPFC),	  the	  dorsal	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (dMPFC),	  the	  posterior	  cingulate	  and	  retrosplenial	  cortex	  (PCC/Rsp),	  inferior	  parietal	  lobule	  (IPL),	  and	  the	  hippocampal	  formation	  (HF+;	  includes	  the	  hippocampus,	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex,	  and	  the	  surrounding	  cortex)	  (Buckner	  et	  al.,	  2008).	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Because	  DMN	  activity	  is	  anticorrelated	  with	  tasks	  that	  require	  externally	  focused	  attention,	  it	  is	  known	  as	  a	  task	  negative	  network.	  Additionally,	  structures	  of	  the	  DMN	  are	  associated	  with	  active	  tasks	  that	  require	  internally	  directed	  attention.	  So,	  the	  DMN	  is	  activated	  both	  when	  an	  individual	  is	  passive	  and	  at	  rest	  (hence	  its	  “default	  mode”	  status),	  and	  when	  he/she	  is	  actively	  directing	  attention	  to	  internal	  mentation.	  Activity	  in	  the	  DMN	  is	  associated	  with	  stimulus-­‐independent	  thought,	  spontaneous	  cognition,	  and	  self-­‐referential	  processing.	  	  Buckner	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  observed	  that	  activity	  in	  the	  DMN	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  cognitive	  tasks,	  including	  autobiographical	  memory,	  envisioning	  the	  future,	  theory	  of	  mind,	  and	  moral	  decision-­‐making.	  He	  proposed	  that	  the	  core	  function	  of	  the	  DMN	  is	  mental	  simulation,	  “imaginative	  constructions	  of	  hypothetical	  events	  or	  scenarios.”	  For	  example,	  structures	  of	  the	  default	  mode	  network	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  agency,	  one	  aspect	  of	  both	  the	  subjective	  and	  narrative	  selves	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  affected	  in	  people	  with	  BPD.	  Farrer	  and	  Frith	  (2002)	  operationalized	  agency	  as	  attributing	  an	  event	  in	  a	  computerized	  task	  to	  oneself,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  experimenter	  that	  was	  also	  influencing	  the	  task.	  Immordino-­‐Yang	  (2012)	  proposes	  two	  brain	  systems	  –	  the	  “looking	  out”	  system	  of	  the	  task	  positive	  networks	  and	  the	  “looking	  in”	  system	  of	  the	  task	  negative	  networks.	  She	  offers	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  brain	  “at	  rest”	  and	  the	  correlated	  default	  mode	  activity	  is	  important	  in	  healthy	  socio-­‐emotional	  functioning,	  and	  coins	  the	  term	  “constructive	  mind	  wandering”	  to	  describe	  the	  spontaneous	  cognition	  that	  supports	  a	  sense	  of	  self.	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The	  activation	  patterns	  and	  function	  of	  the	  DMN	  provide	  some	  evidence	  supporting	  Gallagher’s	  minimal	  and	  narrative	  selves.	  The	  DMN	  is	  implicated	  in	  autobiographical	  memory	  retrieval	  and	  constructing	  mental	  simulations	  of	  past	  events	  or	  possible	  future	  events.	  Therefore	  it	  aligns	  closely	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  narrative	  self,	  as	  it	  would	  putatively	  be	  involved	  in	  constructing	  and	  imagining	  the	  self	  as	  a	  narrative	  through	  time.	  The	  task	  positive	  networks	  correspond	  in	  function	  to	  the	  minimal	  self	  in	  that	  they	  are	  active	  during	  present	  moment	  attention.	  However,	  the	  DMN	  is	  also	  implicated	  in	  self-­‐referential	  processing	  and	  thus	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  contribute	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  and	  ownership.	  Following	  the	  three	  divisions	  of	  self	  outlined	  in	  this	  paper,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  objective	  self	  corresponds	  to	  dominant	  activity	  in	  the	  DMN,	  while	  the	  subjective	  self	  corresponds	  to	  dominant	  activity	  in	  the	  task	  positive	  networks.	  The	  transcendental	  self	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  some	  measure	  of	  the	  decoupling	  of	  these	  two	  networks.	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  latter	  hypothesis.	  Reduced	  functional	  connectivity	  between	  components	  of	  the	  DMN	  and	  task	  positive	  networks	  has	  been	  found	  in	  resting-­‐state	  scans	  of	  experienced	  meditators	  (Farb	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Jack	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  challenge	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  DMN	  versus	  the	  task	  positive	  network	  is	  singly	  characterized	  by	  internally	  versus	  externally	  focused	  attention.	  Their	  imaging	  study	  found	  that	  performing	  social	  reasoning	  tasks	  was	  associated	  with	  DMN	  activation	  and	  task	  positive	  network	  deactivation,	  while	  physical/mechanical	  reasoning	  tasks	  showed	  the	  opposite	  activation	  pattern.	  Both	  sets	  of	  tasks	  required	  external	  attention,	  suggesting	  that	  task	  domain	  is	  an	  important	  predictor	  of	  which	  network	  is	  activated.	  Additionally,	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the	  DMN	  was	  more	  active	  during	  the	  social	  reasoning	  tasks	  than	  during	  a	  rest	  condition.	  Clearly,	  the	  DMN	  is	  a	  new	  research	  area	  and	  more	  revelations	  about	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  its	  function	  will	  likely	  be	  forthcoming.	  However,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  DMN	  and	  task	  positive	  networks	  are	  distinct	  systems	  likely	  representing	  two	  cognitive	  modes	  that	  are	  often	  antagonistic	  in	  activation,	  yet	  under	  some	  conditions	  are	  also	  simultaneously	  active.	  	  	   Aberrations	  in	  DMN	  activity	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  various	  types	  of	  psychopathology,	  including	  depression,	  anxiety,	  attention	  deficit	  hyperactivity	  disorder,	  schizophrenia,	  and	  autism.	  Broyd	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  identify	  four	  types	  of	  DMN	  patterns	  associated	  with	  psychopathology:	  dysfunction	  in	  the	  transition	  between	  rest	  to	  task;	  reduced	  or	  excess	  functional	  connectivity;	  differences	  in	  the	  reciprocal	  relationship	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  anticorrelation	  between	  the	  DMN	  and	  task-­‐positive	  networks;	  and	  differences	  in	  activation	  of	  the	  particular	  subsystems	  within	  the	  DMN	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  specific	  cognitive	  functions.	  In	  general,	  these	  findings	  indicate	  that	  disturbances	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  systems	  of	  introspection	  and	  externally	  focused	  attention	  (or	  perhaps	  socio-­‐emotional	  and	  physical	  domains,	  according	  to	  Jack	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  in	  specific	  areas	  of	  functioning	  within	  each	  system,	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  psychopathology.	  	  	  	   A	  small	  number	  of	  imaging	  studies	  have	  examined	  differences	  in	  the	  DMN	  structure	  and	  function	  of	  BPD	  participants	  and	  comparison	  groups.	  Wolf	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  compared	  resting-­‐state	  fMRI	  scans	  of	  BPD	  participants	  and	  healthy	  controls.	  They	  found	  reduced	  functional	  connectivity	  in	  the	  left	  cuneus	  and	  increased	  connectivity	  in	  the	  fronto-­‐polar	  cortex	  and	  the	  left	  insula.	  Kluetsch	  et	  al.	  (2012)	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conducted	  an	  fMRI	  study	  examining	  DMN	  activity	  during	  pain	  processing.	  Like	  Wolf	  et	  al.,	  they	  found	  differences	  in	  DMN	  functional	  connectivity	  between	  a	  BPD	  group	  and	  a	  control	  group.	  Their	  results	  showed	  reduced	  connectivity	  in	  the	  left	  retrosplenial	  cortex	  and	  the	  left	  superior	  frontal	  gyrus.	  	   	  	  	   Understanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  default	  mode	  network	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  inform	  BPD	  research	  and	  treatment.	  Its	  importance	  to	  social	  cognition	  and	  self-­‐relevant	  processing	  and	  its	  integration	  into	  emotion	  processing	  situate	  it	  at	  the	  neural	  nexus	  of	  core	  areas	  of	  functioning	  that	  are	  disturbed	  in	  BPD.	  It	  could	  be	  an	  important	  biological	  link	  between	  the	  symptoms	  of	  affective	  and	  interpersonal	  instability	  and	  self/identity	  disturbance.	  Further,	  its	  pattern	  of	  activation	  antagonistic	  to	  other	  important	  brain	  networks	  may	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  moment-­‐by-­‐moment	  experience	  of	  BPD	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  intervention	  techniques.	  For	  example,	  mindfulness	  training,	  a	  core	  skill	  in	  Dialectical	  Behavior	  Therapy	  for	  BPD,	  is	  associated	  with	  alterations	  in	  the	  functional	  connectivity	  of	  the	  default	  mode	  network	  (Farb,	  Segal,	  &	  Anderson,	  2013;	  Prakesh	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Farb	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  	  
Discussion	  There	  is	  a	  rich	  clinical	  and	  theoretical	  literature	  on	  BPD	  representing	  psychodynamic,	  cognitive,	  and	  behavioral	  viewpoints.	  Recent	  decades	  have	  also	  seen	  a	  profusion	  of	  empirical	  research	  on	  BPD	  symptomatology,	  treatment,	  individual	  differences,	  and	  neurobiology.	  There	  are	  currently	  several	  different	  treatments	  that	  have	  been	  designed	  specifically	  for	  BPD,	  including	  Dialectical	  Behavior	  Therapy	  (Linehan,	  1993),	  Transference	  Focused	  Psychotherapy	  (Clarkin,	  Yeomans,	  &	  Kernberg,	  2006),	  Mentalization	  Based	  Treatment	  (Fonagy	  &	  Bateman,	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A	  Model	  of	  Self-­Disturbance	  in	  BPD	  	   In	  the	  service	  of	  organizing	  the	  phenomena	  associated	  with	  self-­‐disturbance	  in	  BPD,	  it	  would	  be	  informative	  to	  proceed	  from	  an	  assumption	  that	  the	  components	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  as	  the	  core	  processes	  of	  BPD	  are	  tightly	  intertwined.	  In	  Linehan’s	  model	  it	  is	  emotion	  dysregulation;	  in	  Gunderson’s	  model	  it	  is	  intolerance	  of	  aloneness.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  of	  these	  as	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  Emotion	  dysregulation	  leads	  to	  a	  chaotic	  inner	  experience	  of	  everyday	  life.	  Feeling	  unable	  to	  manage	  daily	  existence	  without	  the	  coherence	  provided	  by	  others,	  individuals	  with	  BPD	  become	  excessively	  dependent	  and	  thus	  intolerant	  of	  aloneness.	  While	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  cognitive	  distortions	  and	  misinterpretations	  (e.g.,	  “frantic	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  real	  or	  imagined	  abandonment,”	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2013),	  the	  intense	  fear	  of	  aloneness	  is	  reasonable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  congruent	  with	  unbearable	  distress.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  intolerance	  of	  aloneness	  feeds	  back	  into	  
Table	  2:	  Processes	  of	  Self	  Disturbance	  in	  BPD	  
Time	  Scale	  Phenomenological	  




Narrative)	  Self	  	  
• rapidly	  shifting	  self	  states	  
• splitting/dichotomous	  thinking	  	  
• negative	  evaluation	  
• cognitive	  distortions/misattributions	  
• Inconsistent	  feedback	  from	  social	  environment	  
• difficulty	  explaining	  behavior	  	  
• unstable	  identity	  
• Unstable	  social	  affiliations,	  values,	  roles,	  attitudes,	  beliefs	  




• affective	  instability	  
• memory	  impairment	  	  
• dissociation	  	  
• self-­‐loathing	  	  
• confusion	  
• cognitive	  fusion	  	  
• incoherence	  
• ambivalence	  	  
Transcendental	  
Self	  	  
• Disconnection	  from	  transcendental	  self	  	   • Rigidity	  • Avoidance	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emotional	  dysregulation,	  as	  intense	  negative	  affect	  is	  evoked	  in	  response	  to	  everyday	  experiences	  of	  separation	  from	  others.	  	  	  The	  processes	  implicated	  in	  self	  disturbance	  in	  BPD	  can	  be	  organized	  by	  type	  and	  temporality	  (Table	  2).	  Present	  moment	  processes	  are	  on	  a	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  scale	  and	  can	  modulate	  throughout	  each	  day.	  Short-­‐term	  processes	  are	  relatively	  proximal,	  taking	  place	  over	  days,	  weeks,	  and	  months.	  Long-­‐term	  processes	  extend	  into	  years	  and	  through	  major	  life	  changes.	  Processes	  across	  time	  unfold	  in	  a	  telescoping	  fashion:	  medium	  term	  processes	  are	  emergent	  properties	  of	  ongoing	  short-­‐term	  processes,	  and	  long-­‐term	  processes	  are	  emergent	  properties	  of	  ongoing	  medium	  term	  processes.	  Additionally,	  processes	  at	  different	  temporal	  levels	  support	  and	  intensify	  each	  other;	  likewise,	  processes	  affecting	  different	  types	  of	  self	  feed	  into	  each	  other.	  
Present	  moment	  processes.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  instability	  of	  self	  associated	  with	  BPD	  is	  that	  it	  reflects	  an	  exaggeration	  of	  the	  normal	  discontinuities	  of	  self	  that	  are	  typically	  negotiated	  by	  higher-­‐order	  regulatory	  systems.	  This	  idea	  draws	  on	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  self	  suggested	  by	  Ryle,	  Young,	  Dennett,	  and	  others.	  It	  also	  builds	  on	  the	  “modularity	  of	  mind”	  models	  of	  cognitive	  architecture,	  which	  propose	  that	  the	  brain	  has	  evolved	  as	  a	  system	  of	  modules	  with	  independent	  functions	  (Fodor,	  1983;	  Carruthers,	  2006).	  The	  system	  of	  multiple	  selves	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  functionally	  organized	  consortiums	  of	  modules	  with	  selective	  access	  to	  behavioral	  repertoires.	  These	  selves	  sometimes	  work	  seamlessly	  in	  concert,	  but	  do	  not	  march	  in	  lock	  step,	  and	  often	  are	  competing	  with	  each	  other.	  Communication	  between	  functional	  selves	  (Ryle’s	  self-­‐states	  or	  Beck’s	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modes)	  is	  not	  always	  adequate.	  Control	  systems	  nevertheless	  serve	  to	  regulate	  and	  coordinate	  the	  activity	  of	  these	  selves	  and	  thus	  maintain	  some	  measure	  of	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  in	  behavior.	  	  Borderline	  pathology	  may	  be	  characterized	  by	  the	  overwhelming	  of	  control	  systems	  by	  intense,	  rapidly	  engaged	  affective	  responses,	  especially	  negatively	  valenced	  ones.	  This	  process	  may	  be	  further	  facilitated	  by	  weakened	  control	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  affective	  regulation	  and,	  in	  keeping	  with	  a	  tendency	  toward	  impulsivity,	  behavioral	  regulation.	  Neuroimaging	  studies	  comparing	  people	  with	  BPD	  to	  healthy	  controls	  when	  presented	  with	  negative	  stimuli	  support	  this	  general	  mechanism	  (see	  Ruocco,	  Amirthavasagam,	  Choi-­‐Kain,	  &	  McMain,	  2013,	  for	  a	  meta-­‐analysis).	  With	  control	  systems	  impaired,	  the	  various	  functional	  selves	  have	  unchecked	  access	  to	  behavioral	  output	  systems.	  For	  example,	  evidence	  of	  the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex’s	  role	  in	  switching	  between	  automatic	  and	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  its	  disruption	  may	  prevent	  executive	  functions	  from	  superseding	  automatic	  behavior	  patterns	  (Gremel	  &	  Costa,	  2013).	  If	  multiple	  functional	  selves	  are	  activated	  with	  comparable	  affective	  intensity,	  instability	  characterized	  by	  sudden	  and	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  behavior	  and	  affect	  may	  result.	  These	  selves	  are,	  by	  definition,	  narrow	  in	  range.	  Some	  may	  be	  particularly	  narrow,	  which	  may	  account	  for	  the	  description	  of	  primitive	  defenses	  and	  regression	  in	  the	  psychodynamic	  literature,	  and	  the	  “child”	  schemata	  in	  Young’s	  theory.	  	   Kernberg’s	  object	  relations	  theory	  of	  BPD	  proposes	  self-­‐other	  object	  pairs,	  each	  joined	  by	  a	  specific	  affect.	  These	  pairs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  analogous	  to	  the	  functional	  selves	  in	  the	  current	  model	  in	  that	  they	  are	  functionally	  organized	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(associated	  with	  a	  particular	  interpersonal	  context)	  and	  recruit	  specific	  affective,	  cognitive	  and	  behavioral	  repertoires.	  Splitting	  and	  dichotomous	  thinking	  can	  be	  explained	  similarly.	  Intense,	  dysregulated	  affect	  is	  extreme	  and	  thus	  polarized	  by	  definition.	  An	  intensely	  activated	  self	  that	  is	  interpersonally	  affiliative	  in	  function	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  idealization;	  likewise,	  an	  intensely	  activated	  self	  that	  is	  protective	  in	  function	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  devaluation.	  Compounding	  this	  effect	  is	  that	  an	  activated	  self	  may	  be	  narrow	  in	  its	  behavioral	  repertoire	  and	  thus	  respond	  in	  inappropriate	  and	  maladaptive	  ways,	  such	  as	  intense	  expressions	  of	  anger.	  	   Affective	  instability	  and	  exaggerated	  discontinuities	  in	  experience	  and	  behavior	  disrupt	  the	  narrative	  self	  in	  the	  moment.	  There	  are	  two	  effects	  that	  may	  contribute	  to	  this.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  attenuated	  regulatory	  functions	  and	  narrowing	  of	  behavioral	  repertoires	  preclude	  higher	  cognitive	  processing.	  Thus	  the	  capacities	  to	  view	  current	  events	  in	  context,	  take	  different	  perspectives,	  retrieve	  relevant	  autobiographical	  memories,	  mentalize,	  and	  make	  meaning,	  are	  impaired.	  The	  other	  effect	  is	  that	  the	  individual’s	  thoughts,	  emotions,	  and	  behavior	  –	  the	  content	  of	  the	  objective	  self	  -­‐	  are	  more	  chaotic,	  and	  thus	  more	  difficult	  to	  process.	  In	  sum,	  impaired	  processing	  abilities	  applied	  to	  events	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  process	  cause	  a	  disruption	  in	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  conception	  of	  the	  narrative	  self.	  This	  account	  is	  consistent	  with	  Koenigsburg	  et	  al.’s	  (2001)	  finding	  of	  an	  association	  between	  affective	  instability	  and	  identity	  disturbance	  (objective	  self)	  as	  well	  as	  emptiness	  (subjective	  self).	  	   Finally,	  the	  ability	  to	  contact	  the	  transcendental	  self	  via	  perspective	  taking	  is	  disrupted.	  While	  the	  transcendental	  self	  is	  conceived	  as	  an	  ongoing	  property	  of	  the	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phenomenological	  self,	  an	  individual	  can	  be	  cognitively	  engaged	  with	  it	  or	  disengaged	  from	  it	  –	  or,	  perhaps	  more	  accurately,	  engaged	  in	  taking	  a	  different	  perspective.	  Engaging	  the	  transcendental	  self	  serves	  to	  “loosen”	  cognitive	  and	  behavioral	  processes,	  that	  is,	  promote	  flexibility	  of	  thought	  and	  action.	  This	  is	  a	  central	  construct	  in	  Acceptance	  and	  Commitment	  Therapy	  called	  psychological	  flexibility	  (Hayes,	  Strosahl,	  &	  Wilson,	  1999).	  The	  result	  of	  disconnecting	  from	  the	  transcendental	  self	  is	  cognitive	  and	  behavioral	  rigidity,	  perseveration,	  and	  avoidance.	  This	  perpetuates	  the	  pathological	  processes	  of	  BPD.	  	   Short-­term	  processes.	  The	  gap	  between	  an	  individual’s	  emotional	  experience	  and	  their	  feedback	  from	  others	  causes	  disorganization	  in	  the	  process	  of	  self	  knowledge	  over	  longer	  periods	  of	  time.	  Individuals	  with	  BPD	  that	  have	  not	  received	  any	  diagnosis	  are	  in	  the	  same	  predicament	  as	  other	  important	  actors	  in	  their	  lives	  (friends,	  family	  members,	  intimate	  partners):	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  how	  to	  reconcile	  borderline	  experience	  with	  that	  of	  “normal”	  emotional	  experience.	  Without	  more	  accurate	  explanations	  for	  their	  emotions	  and	  behavior,	  what	  usually	  are	  substituted	  are	  negative	  attributions	  for	  self	  and	  others.	  An	  evaluation	  of	  another	  may	  be:	  “I	  feel	  so	  bad	  that	  this	  other	  person	  must	  have	  made	  me	  feel	  that	  way,	  therefore	  they	  are	  bad	  and	  dangerous.”	  Judgments	  from	  self	  or	  others	  may	  include	  characterizations	  as	  manipulative,	  lazy,	  irrational,	  crazy,	  callous,	  cruel,	  or	  mean.	  	  This	  disorganizing	  effect	  is	  particularly	  strong	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  Whether	  splitting	  is	  an	  active	  process	  à	  la	  Kernberg	  or	  is	  a	  specific	  case	  of	  dichotomous	  thinking	  -­‐	  polarity	  caused	  by	  emotional	  dysregulation	  -­‐	  does	  not	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change	  the	  essential	  experience.	  Initial	  elation	  and	  idealization	  of	  a	  partner	  is	  eventually	  followed	  by	  devaluation.	  Gradually	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  partner,	  the	  relationship,	  and	  the	  self	  in	  the	  relationship,	  is	  unbearably	  polarized.	  The	  affective	  experience,	  and	  thus	  cognitive	  evaluations	  and	  interpersonal	  behavior,	  jolts	  between	  extremes	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  valence.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  exhausting	  and	  distressing	  for	  both	  partners,	  but	  because	  individuals	  with	  BPD	  may	  adopt	  identity	  characteristics	  of	  those	  around	  them,	  volatility	  in	  a	  close	  relationship	  translates	  into	  volatility	  in	  identity.	  At	  the	  subjective	  level,	  feelings	  of	  emptiness	  and	  fear	  of	  abandonment	  arise.	  A	  profound	  feeling	  of	  ambivalence	  may	  also	  accompany	  relationship	  volatility.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  two	  strongly	  polarized	  motivations:	  to	  preserve	  the	  relationship	  at	  all	  costs	  to	  prevent	  coming	  unmoored	  and	  feeling	  completely	  alone,	  and	  to	  escape	  the	  pain	  and	  distress	  that	  accompany	  the	  emotional	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  relationship.	  
Long-­term	  processes.	  As	  BPD	  symptomatology	  persists	  across	  life	  changes,	  long-­‐term	  processes	  are	  manifest.	  Dramatic	  and	  frequent	  shifts	  in	  preferences,	  attitudes,	  values,	  friends,	  and	  careers	  may	  occur.	  Endings	  of	  relationships,	  particularly	  longer-­‐term	  ones,	  may	  be	  marked	  by	  an	  objective	  difficulty	  in	  constructing	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  relationship	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  partner,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  subjective	  sense	  of	  loss	  of	  identity	  and	  emptiness.	  Intolerance	  of	  aloneness	  may	  propel	  an	  individual	  with	  BPD	  to	  quickly	  seek	  out	  another	  relationship.	  	  	   Over	  the	  long-­‐term,	  the	  difficulty	  constructing	  a	  narrative	  identity	  is	  writ	  large.	  As	  Adler	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  report,	  life	  story	  narratives	  of	  individuals	  with	  BPD	  are	  marked	  by	  greater	  incoherence	  and	  less	  sense	  of	  agency	  than	  narratives	  of	  those	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without	  BPD.	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  cumulative	  effects	  of	  instability	  lead	  to	  a	  difficulty	  constructing	  a	  coherent	  life	  narrative,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  self	  is	  not	  an	  active	  agent	  within	  a	  narrative,	  but	  a	  passive	  object	  of	  external	  events.	  To	  borrow	  Dennett’s	  term,	  a	  person	  with	  BPD	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  reliably	  locate	  a	  center	  of	  narrative	  gravity	  in	  their	  autobiographical	  accounts.	  Again,	  one	  contributing	  factor	  may	  be	  the	  inherent	  difficulty	  in	  explaining	  behavior	  and	  relationships	  that	  were	  influenced	  by	  BPD	  symptoms	  without	  even	  knowing	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  BPD,	  let	  alone	  account	  for	  its	  complex	  sequelae.	  Another	  possible	  influence	  is	  that	  major	  life	  changes	  tend	  to	  evoke	  the	  most	  stress	  and	  emotion,	  heightening	  the	  disorganizing	  effect	  of	  BPD	  on	  crucial	  junctures	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  life	  narrative.	  	   The	  false	  or	  alien	  self	  featured	  in	  the	  theories	  of	  Masterson	  and	  Fonagy	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  due	  to	  early	  attachment	  problems.	  An	  alternative	  (but	  not	  necessarily	  incompatible)	  explanation	  is	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  an	  ongoing	  reflection	  of	  unstable	  identity	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  people	  with	  BPD	  adopt	  the	  characteristics	  of	  others	  around	  them.	  Thus	  the	  false	  self	  may	  be	  a	  public	  persona	  that	  is	  continually	  constructed	  to	  adapt	  to	  social	  demands.	  Given	  the	  self	  disturbance	  of	  BPD	  and	  the	  impetus	  to	  hide	  the	  ongoing	  distress	  of	  BPD	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  socially,	  this	  false	  self	  may	  be	  substantially	  less	  informed	  by	  the	  subjective	  self	  than	  the	  average	  public	  persona.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  in	  the	  BPD	  literature	  is	  Marsha	  Linehan’s	  description	  of	  apparent	  competence,	  “the	  tendency	  of	  borderline	  individuals	  to	  appear	  competent	  and	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  everyday	  life	  at	  some	  times,	  and	  at	  other	  times	  (unexpectedly,	  to	  the	  observer)	  as	  if	  the	  observed	  competencies	  did	  not	  exist”	  (1993).	  Another	  is	  the	  “quiet	  borderline	  patient”	  or	  the	  “as-­‐if	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personality”	  described	  by	  Helene	  Deutsch	  (2007,	  originally	  published	  1942)	  and	  further	  elaborated	  by	  Vance	  R.	  Sherwood	  and	  Charles	  C.	  Cohen	  (1994).	  	  In	  Fonagy’s	  theory,	  this	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  “pretend	  mode,”	  in	  which	  an	  individual’s	  internal	  mentation	  is	  disconnected	  from	  external	  reality	  and	  yet	  experienced	  as	  real	  (Fonagy	  &	  Bateman,	  2006).	  	  
Conclusion	  	   BPD	  has	  recently	  received	  much-­‐needed	  empirical	  examination.	  Disturbance	  of	  self	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  BPD	  and	  represents	  an	  opportunity	  for	  further	  research	  that	  will	  ideally	  lead	  to	  improved	  outcomes	  for	  people	  with	  BPD.	  This	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  an	  integrative	  approach	  that	  draws	  on	  many	  theories	  to	  find	  commonalities	  and	  unique	  contributions.	  BPD	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  formidable	  challenge	  and	  those	  affected	  by	  it	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  interdisciplinary	  collaboration	  from	  all	  corners	  of	  the	  mental	  health	  community.	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